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Abstract 
 
In a platform ecosystem, complementors can utilize 
various resources from a platform owner that receives 
a variety of products/services via complementors for 
better customers’ choice and satisfaction. The literature 
has focused on the cooperative nature of the platform 
ecosystem. Less attention, however, has been given to 
coopetition (i.e., simultaneous strategic use of 
cooperation and competition). Drawing upon paradox 
theory, this study develops a research model that 
explains the individual and joint impact of coopetition 
balance and coopetition capability on relationship 
performance in a platform ecosystem. Based on survey 
data from 365 complementors to Amazon, this study 
illustrates that coopetition balance and coopetition 
capability have a significant impact on relationship 
performance. Additionally, coopetition capability 
moderates the relationship between coopetition balance 
and relationship performance. In particular, results 
show that coopetition capability is the most critical 
variable to enhance relationship performance. 
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in 
this paper.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Platform-based markets have been prevalent 
recently in various fields such as smartphones, video 
game consoles, search engines, or e-commerce [11, 30, 
34]. As the effectiveness of the platform ecosystem 
relies on dynamic interactions among consumers, 
complementors, and a platform owner, their  partnership 
has been emphasized [15, 21]. A large number of 
entrepreneurs, serving as complementors to a platform, 
have established their businesses by utilizing the 
technical, managerial, and logistical infrastructure of a 
platform.  
This collaboration, however, has been polluted by a 
platform’s entry into complementors’ product markets. 
Studies have reported that complementors have been 
pushed out of their product space, not by competitors 
but by a platform owner [34]. As complementors depend 
heavily on having access to customers and resources 
through a platform, they are exposed to the risk of the 
asymmetric relationship. The literature finds that 
Amazon’s direct competition with complementors 
results in reduced shipping cost, implying benefits for 
customers on the contrary to the welfare of 
complementors [34]. This emergence of competition in 
a platform ecosystem has certainly hindered small third-
party sellers to grow in their businesses.  
While direct competition with a platform owner 
would be adverse conditions, complementors should 
accept instead of ignoring coopetition and rather see a 
new opportunity by generating synergies over the 
paradoxical coexistence of cooperation and 
competition. Studies argue that competition seems to 
deteriorate cooperation at a given point in time, but the 
dynamic association between cooperation and 
competition will reinforce firms over time [15]. As firms 
need to oscillate between cooperation and competition, 
the purpose of this study is to examine the individual 
and joint impact of coopetition balance and coopetition 
capability, both of which mitigate negative tensions of 
coopetition, on relationship performance in the context 
of a platform ecosystem.   
The present study contributes to providing insights 
into coopetition for academicians and practitioners. 
First, this study adds value to the body of the coopetition 
literature. Studies have focused on cooperative 
behaviors for value creation or examined competitive 
dynamics for superiority separately [20]. In other words, 
limited attention has been given to coopetition, 
simultaneous strategic use of cooperation and 
competition [2, 15]. The literature accordingly calls for 
coopetition research, and this study provides an in-depth 
account of coopetition with a theory-driven research 
model and an empirical test. 
Second, the present study contributes to enhancing 
understandings of coopetition with a contextual focus 
on a platform-based market. Researchers have 
emphasized cooperative dynamics in the platform 
business model [21]. Complementors, however, has less 
direct access to customers and more reliance on a 
platform’s resources, indicating asymmetric 
relationships. Consequently, their capacity to cope with 
a wide spectrum of a platform’s strategic positioning is 
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critical. As the interplay of cooperation and competition 
would create or damage value cocreation, favorable 
conditions for complementors to facilitate positive 
performance should be investigated [15]. This study 
sheds light on offering a strategic guidance for 
complementors. 
Third, the present study provides explanations to the 
literature by explicating how mixed results of 
coopetition can be reconciled. As firms seek to 
accomplish the best of cooperation and competition, 
there inevitably exists tensions between the two 
paradoxical coexistence. The two conflicting demands 
also result in differing outcomes: positive and negative 
[2]. It is important for firms to strike a right balance 
while pursing cooperation and competition 
simultaneously, but the current literature falls short of 
offering meaningful insights. In addition, coopetition 
capability is known to mitigate tensions arising from 
simultaneous cooperation and competition [1], but not 
many empirical studies are reported. This study 
examines coopetition balance and coopetition capability 
and investigates how their interactions escalate positive 
results from coopetition.  
 
2. Theoretical foundation: Paradoxical 
coexistence in coopetition  
 
The theory of paradox provides a theoretical 
foundation for coopetition. In the increasingly 
competitive, fast-paced environment, two conflicting 
demands are frequently requested to pursue jointly, 
often called as paradoxes, as part of adaptive capacity 
for survival and sustainability at the individual, team, 
and organizational levels: knowledge management 
(exploitation vs. exploration), strategy (cooperation vs. 
competition), organizational structure (centralization vs. 
decentralization), governance (relational vs. 
contractual), operations (quality excellence vs. 
innovation), teamwork (task- vs. relational oriented), 
employees life (work vs. home), and leadership (control 
vs. empowerment) [16]. Paradox is defined as 
“contradictory yet interrelated elements that exists 
simultaneously and persist over time” [29, p. 382]. As 
indicated, the concept entails the simultaneity and 
persistence of tensions between two competing goals 
[28], and complementors in the platform ecosystem are 
expected to manage ostensibly incompatible 
perspectives (i.e., cooperation and competition) for 
sustaining competitiveness. As paradoxes defy 
resolutions, scholars suggest three steps for manage it 
effectively, and those are insightful for complementors: 
(1) accepting, (2) accommodating, and (3) 
differentiating/integrating [28]. Accepting is related to 
“learning to live with the paradox” [17, p. 764] 
Accommodating is associated with “defining a novel, 
creative synergy that addresses both oppositional 
elements together” [28, p. 1594]. 
Differentiating/integrating includes “honoring unique 
aspects of each notion” and combining them for 
synergies and linkages [28, p. 1594]. 
In the technical sense, a platform is defined as “an 
extensible technological foundation and the interfaces 
used by extensions that interoperate with it” [31, p. 267]. 
Also, platform ecosystems are describes as “a platform 
and its collection of complementary extensions” [31, p. 
267]. This context can be well understood with the App 
store at Apple. However, we would like to focus more 
on an e-marketplace, “an Internet platform-based 
market through which both sides of an exchange – 
buyers and sellers – conduct transactions” [18, p. 209]. 
In this platform environment, platform owners provide 
technical, managerial, and logistical infrastructure to 
complementors (i.e., third-party sellers) that in turn 
supply a variety of products to the platform. 
Paradoxes carry illogical elements that generate 
uncertainty and ambiguity, and they enhance tensions 
cognitively or emotionally [28]. In the context of a 
platform ecosystem, complementors would be pressured 
with the entry into a product space by a platform owner. 
Tension is a double-edged sword that could generate 
innovative, optimistic behaviors, while significantly 
escalating needless stress, unnecessary frustration, and 
counterproductive defenses [22]. In other words, it can 
create a virtuous cycle that complementors identify new 
opportunities, integrate necessary resources, develop a 
new solution, and continue to sustain their competitive 
advantage. On the other hand, tension can fuel 
frustration, confusion, and defenses for complementors.  
Two views have been reported when facing tensions: 
“dilemma” and “natural and persistent” [22]. The 
dilemma view sees tensions as tradeoffs, indicating that 
an organization/individual gives up one over the other 
with the idea of either/or. The “natural and persistent” 
view illustrates that firms are required to have ongoing 
responses rather than one-time resolution [28]. The 
“natural and persistent” view may appear as 
opportunities that escalate learning and adaptability [22, 
28]. This study takes the view of “natural and persistent” 
as complementors should continually adjust their 
tensions with the proper relationship with a platform 
owner. 
     
3. What is coopetition? 
 
Given that a half of cooperation occurs among 
competitors, cooperation and competition are 
inseparably intertwined [3]. The two research streams, 
however, have evolved independently, and the literature 
has recently acknowledged the need for combining them 
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simultaneously [15]. The literature defines coopetition 
as competing without killing the opposition and 
cooperating without ignoring self-interest [4]. 
Coopetition has been noticed in two different paths. 
Competition proceeds cooperation or vice versa [15]. At 
times, firms find themselves in working with their 
competitors with the pooling of increased 
complementarity of resources and synergetic 
combinations of market- or industry-specific expertise. 
They build trust with long-time rivals to mitigate price 
competition for general economic welfare and expand 
new markets and novel technologies by sharing risks. 
Coopetition, on the other hand, has been established 
from cooperation to competition. Firms pursue a 
coopetition strategy, especially when they need (1) 
technical capabilities, (2) share knowledge and 
resources, work together for events, technical standards, 
regulations, and (3) create oneness or we-ness, (4) 
create/expand new markets, and (5) collude on price [4, 
20]. When the market matures, organizations see 
cooperation as inefficient strategy and move toward 
competition for financial optimization [20]. 
A stream of the coopetition study has flowed into 
illuminating its antecedents and consequences, although 
it is quite overlapped with separate studies on 
cooperation and competition. Antecedents to 
coopetition include risk reduction, cost sharing, and 
resource access and pooling [3, 15]. Additionally, the 
literature presents consequences of coopetition such as 
better performance, incremental/radical innovations, 
and the diversity of technology [3, 15, 26].  
Another focus on coopetition is its impact on value 
creation or value appropriation [13]. Studies have 
elaborated on outcomes of coopetition as its polarized 
interferences, beneficial or hurtful, have been made. 
Coopetition would generate joint value creation, 
individual firm value creation, or value destruction for 
both parties [13]. A firm can have more or lesser value 
than its partners, or costs from coopetitive relationships 
are much higher than benefits. 
Also, research context for coopetition studies should 
be mentioned. A triadic relationship among a buyer and 
two suppliers was examined for coopetition in the 
context of supply chain network [24, 32]. In the small 
and medium sized enterprise context, coopetition was 
examined. Small craft beer firms compete with each 
other while cooperating together against mass producers 
[20]. Similar to the present study, coopetition between 
complementors and a platform owner was examined in 
the context of platform-based market [34]. 
Based upon the paradox theory, tensions are 
inevitably generated when contradictory concepts meet 
with each other, and positive/negative consequences of 
the tension are contingent on context and a firm’s 
management [2]. Complementors in the platform 
ecosystem cannot be exceptional, and need to properly 
manage it. To mitigate negative tensions for 
complementors, this study presents two important 
capacities: coopetition balance and coopetition 
capability. 
 
4. What is coopetition balance?  
 
The literature defines coopetition balance as 
“evenness between competition and cooperation” [13, p. 
2522]. The concept can be thought of as the parity 
between the two paradoxical coexistence. It is the status 
when a firm finds a harmony between the conflicting 
forces while pursuing the two seemingly differing goals 
simultaneously. The main purpose of the contradictory 
pursuit lies in concurrently accomplishing goals that 
cooperate to create value together beyond a firm’s 
capacity by leveraging resources from alliance partners 
and that compete to capture more shares of a joint value 
created with better quality and performance [4, 15]. In 
other words, cooperation and competition for 
complementors in the platform ecosystem are in need of 
being reasonably balanced in their collaboration. 
Without adequate cooperation, there is no existence of 
alliance, and without sufficient attention to competition, 
alliances would unwittingly lose their competitive 
advantage.  
In the context of the platform ecosystem, part of 
interorganizational relationships, there is a tendency to 
view that value creation is related to cooperation and 
value appropriation is associated with competition [15]. 
The bottom line of the argument lies in the 
understanding that cooperation and competition have 
inherent trade-offs. This view, however, is not always 
the case, as literature presents the “natural and 
persistent” view. Competition in the complementor-
platform relationship can help complementors develop 
their potential, enhance operational excellence, and 
generate more innovations, all of which are related to 
value creation to the firm and customers. 
Certainly, the interplay of cooperation and 
competition would either create or destroy values, and 
thus the academic community attempts to find boundary 
conditions resulting in good outcomes. While avoiding 
the risk of undermining cooperation due to competition, 
the issue of striking an appropriate balance is essential. 
The tension management through coopetition balance is 
an imperative task to achieve desired outcomes. 
 
5. What is coopetition capability?  
 
Despite possibly beneficial effects of coopetition, 
the paradoxical coexistence of cooperation and 
competition would generate potentials to deteriorate 
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trust between partners and even break partnership. In 
line with coping with negative tensions of coopetition, 
the literature has also presented coopetition capability 
that could defend competition threats or dampen 
undesirable impacts of coopetition. Coopetition 
capability is an organization’s capability that manages 
interorganizational relationships in order to properly 
confront contradicting realities, and it is defined as “the 
ability to think paradoxically and to initiate processes 
that help firms attain and maintain a moderate level of 
tension, irrespective of the strength of the paradox” [1, 
p. 19]. It is also described as “evaluative capabilities” 
[32] in which firms assess situations, make sense of their 
strategic pursuit, and position properly for better firm 
performance. Especially, coopetition capability can be a 
crucial capacity that complementors should possess in 
case they face competition with a platform owner as part 
of reducing competitive tensions and producing 
effective strategic positioning. The capability is not 
static but dynamic, given that complementors need to 
continually assess the scope of their cooperation and 
competition according to changing relationships.  
Researchers have acknowledged “swimming with 
sharks” that large firms are strongly motivated to 
misappropriate value created through engaging with 
small firms [14]. It is also consistent with literature on 
coopetition that firms would be willing to cooperate for 
value creation but turn their positions to be competitors 
when it comes to value capture [4, 34]. Not surprisingly, 
smaller firms see to cooperate with a platform owner 
with the anticipation of potential benefits, but they are 
apparently exposed to risks such as misappropriation. 
To safeguard this challenge, complementors should 
have coopetition capability that effectively manage 
tensions between cooperation and competition. 
 
6. Hypothesis development  
 
The literature has elaborated on performance 
outcomes in the context of interorganizational 
relationships: opportunism, overall satisfaction, 
relationship performance, and market performance [6]. 
In particular, we have focused on relationship 
performance as this study examines how coopetition 
balance and coopetition capability have an impact on 
their relationships with a platform owner. Relationship 
performance is described as economic outcomes of a 
complementor-platform owner partnership in the form 
of profitability, sales volume, market share, marketing 
support, and efficiency enhancement [19]. It is about 
shared outcomes of involving parities as results of 
coopetitive interactions. As relationship performance 
refers to the tangible consequences of business 
relationship between partners, the use of the construct 
will help the academic community understand the 
influence of coopetition balance, coopetition capability, 
and their joint interaction in the context of the platform 
ecosystem.  
It is reported that coopetition can be a productive 
strategy when a firm establishes a reasonable balance 
between competing perspectives [13]. This present 
study acknowledges existing understandings and further 
examines the impact particularly in the relationship 
between coopetition balance and relationship 
performance. Coopetition balance mitigates the adverse 
effects of the imbalance between cooperation and 
competition. In case complementors face situations 
where competition suffocates cooperation, the 
competitive atmosphere is so intense that 
complementors hardly trust a platform owner and 
opportunistic behaviors get spread quickly. Such 
opposing environments hinder complementors or a 
platform owner from sharing resources and producing 
synergies by complementing each entity’s limitations. 
On the other hand, complementors or a platform owner 
may be complacent in case cooperation trumps over 
competition. They may have a tendency to do what is 
required or demanded instead of developing innovations 
for changing business environments. Without having 
the leeway to exchange adequate and reciprocal 
feedback with each other, the relationship would put a 
conformance to the standards and race to the bottom 
cost. This type of collaborative pressure can be stressful, 
particularly when a platform owner puts self-interest 
first and takes advantage of complementors. When 
cooperation and competition are balanced on the side of 
complementors, however, such adverse effects can be 
controlled and lead coopetition into products results. 
When complementors reach a dynamic equilibrium 
between cooperation and competition, comparable 
emphasis on each element is place for their strategy, and 
it keeps opposing in check. It may be understood that 
cooperation and competition have inherent trade-offs. 
This is in line with the dilemma view of tensions. On the 
contrary to this view, the paradox theory presents the 
“natural and persistent” view, indicating that firms 
continue to respond to paradoxical situations instead of 
one-time solutions [22]. In other words, rivalrous spirit 
and mutual cooperation should take place at the same 
time, and complementors may target common goals and 
share resources while putting their best efforts to attain 
excellence over the other. Consequently, the harmony 
between cooperation and competition enables 
complementors to drive positive results together, and we 
present a hypothesis: 
 
H1: Complementors’ coopetition balance is 
positively related to relationship performance in the 
context of the platform ecosystem.   
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Coopetition capability is likely to have a direct 
impact on relationship performance as it offers an 
institutional framework that monitors ongoing 
interactions between a platform owner and the 
complementor. In other words, coopetition capability is 
associated with complementors’ capacity to properly 
manage tensions arising from the paradoxical 
coexistence of cooperation and competition and helps 
formulate adaptability to fast-changing circumstances 
more effectively. The paradox theory argues that the 
“natural and persist view” of tensions is related to 
opportunities for learning and adaptability. 
Complementors are willing to work together with a 
platform owner that provides significant resources. In 
the course of doing so, there is a chance that 
complementors may settle down with relational inertia 
being more content with the status quo and being less 
efficient and innovative. Relational inertia drives firms 
to be complacent with what they have and to be less 
proactive in their own advances on novel and new 
approaches [13]. In case a platform owner strategically 
decides to enter the place space of a complementor, its 
coopetition capability will defend competition threats 
and dampen negative influences instead of facing 
challenges with no preparation. Research shows that the 
market entrance of a platform owner may hurt 
complementors in a short run, but it will strengthen the 
platform ecosystem with more benefits in the long run 
[15]. In particular, volatile changes in relationships, a 
complementor’s capability understanding cooperation 
and competition will furnish principles, procedures, and 
proactiveness by alleviating opportunism and elevating 
relationship performance. As coopetition capability 
provides complementors with solving problems quickly 
and accomplishing performance targets, we present the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Complementors’ coopetition capability is 
positively related to relationship performance in the 
context of the platform ecosystem. 
 
An interesting research question is whether the joint 
use of coopetition balance and coopetition capability is 
more effective in fostering relationship performance 
then individual use. It is a common strategy that 
complementors pursue decreasing costs by utilizing a 
platform’s resources and increasing growth by having 
more access to a platform’s customer base. In doing so, 
complementors face inevitable challenges that a 
platform may enter into their product space and increase 
variances in returns. Just as complementors’ 
dependence on a platform’s infrastructure, business 
processes, and customer interactions, so 
complementors’ smartness should grow by being 
dynamically equipped with coopetition balance and 
coopetition capability. We argue that synergetic effects 
could exist for relationship performance when both 
coopetition balance and coopetition capability are 
simultaneously in place. Coopetition balance provides 
firms with stability by “offsetting potential challenges 
and keeping opposing forces in check” [13, p. 2522]. In 
other words, the balance approaches of cooperation and 
competition bring firms well-adjusted responses to two 
conflicting elements and enhance a firm’s flexibility. 
Coopetition capability provides complementors with an 
institutional framework that monitors interactions 
between the platform owner and the firm. A 
combination of coopetition balance and coopetition 
capability can pay continued attention to relationship 
changes between the platform and complements and 
unlock their potentials to grow continually. It is 
associated with complementors’ capacity to continue to 
assess the current situation and develop their responses 
instead of one-time solution based upon the paradox 
theory. The combination of coopetition balance and 
coopetition capability can offer the firm’s configuration 
that understand market changes and reconfigurations 
that reorganize their resources and respond to the 
market. The two forces offer stimulation for executing 
proper strategies. We propose that these together will 
lead to better relationship performance. 
   
H3: The impact of coopetition balance on 
relationship performance is moderated by 
coopetition capability, such that the relationship 
becomes stronger in the presence of high coopetition 
capability in the context of the platform ecosystem. 
 
7. Research methods  
 
This study selected the platform ecosystem at 
Amazon.com for several reasons. Amazon is a leading 
online e-commerce platform in the world, and Amazon 
marketplace launched in 2000 by enabling third-party 
sellers to introduce their products to Amazon customers. 
FBA (Fulfillment by Amazon) allows complementors to 
use Amazon’s infrastructure for inventory control, 
storage, and shipping with pick-and-pack customer 
service. Also, research has shown that Amazon enters 
complementors’ market for reorganizing their product 
quality and profit-maximizing strategies [34]. Although 
a different platform would be a good candidate, 
Amazon.com is arguably the most appropriate setting to 
investigate the impact of coopetition. 
The survey questionnaire was created and 
administered to senior-level management. Although this 
research hired a professional data collection company 
for recruiting Amazon vendors, the survey 
administration and data collection processes were under 
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the control of the authors. The use of a data collection 
company increased our ability to cover the intended 
population of this study and then enhanced the 
generalizability of the research results.  
Prior to conducting a large-scale survey, we 
conducted a pilot study with two ways: four academic 
researchers who have sufficient knowledge and 
experiences in IS, operations, and management and 64 
vendors that do their businesses with Amazon. 
Following a check on convergent and discriminant 
validity, necessary changes were made. A large-scale 
survey was administered to test the research model. A 
total of 625 Amazon vendors who were qualified for the 
survey were invited to answer the survey, and 365 firms 
completed it, resulting in a 58.4% response rate. 
Respondents held job titles such as C-level executives, 
vice presidents, directors, or senior managers. Table 1 
presents the demographic features of the samples in this 
study. Response/non-response bias was examined by 
comparing the earlier responses with the later ones. A 
Chi-square test on annual sales and number of 
employees showed no significant difference. 
 
Table 1. Demographic features of the sample 
 
Category Percent 
Home & Kitchen 10.4% 
Health & Personal Care 10.4% 
Clothing & Accessories 13.4% 
Books & Movies 6.3% 
Toys & Games 6.8% 
Sports & Outdoors 4.4% 
Beauty 6.3% 
Grocery & Gourmet Food 6.0% 
Tools & Home Improvement 2.7% 
Pet Supplies 3.0% 
Office Products 6.3% 
Patio, Lawn & Garden 0.5% 
Automotive 1.4% 
Arts, Crafts & Sewing 4.1% 
Baby Products 1.6% 
Jewelry 3.0% 
Cell Phones & Accessories 5.8% 
Other 7.4% 
Annual Sales  
Less than $100,000 25.8% 
$100,000 – $500,000 21.9% 
$500,000 – $1 million 18.1% 
$1 million – $5 million 18.1% 
Over $5 million 16.2% 
Number of Employees  
1 – 5 18.9% 
6 – 10 7.4% 
11 – 50 12.9% 
51 – 100 13.2% 
101 – 500 20.3% 
501 – 1,000 19.2% 
Over 1000 8.2% 
 
7.1. Measures 
  
We adapted existing items for cooperation [5, 9, 33], 
coopetition capability [1], and relationship performance 
[6, 19]. Our survey employed multiple-item measures 
for all of the construct. In particular, we used latent 
congruence modeling to develop coopetition balance 
from separate items of cooperation and competition. 
Latent congruence modeling is a variation of structural 
equation modeling that was recently advocated as a 
useful tool to measure congruence between two 
competing constructs [12, 23]. The modeling is 
especially relevant in the context of coopetition that 
emphasizes fit between two conflicting concepts in the 
platform ecosystem. Latent congruent modeling 
controls for measurement errors, examines 
measurement equivalence, and provides a more relevant 
measure of congruence. It creates two second-order 
factors from two components of interest: mean (i.e., 
level) and differences (i.e., congruence) based upon the 
formula below.  
 
Level = |Cooperation + Competition|/2 
 
Congruence = |Cooperation-Competition| 
 
In the context of this study, the level implies the 
average of cooperation and competition, and the 
congruence represents similarity in the extent of 
cooperation and competition. Coopetition balance is 
proxied by congruence [23]. A higher congruence score 
indicates a greater difference between cooperation and 
competition. It means dissimilarity rather than similarity 
and overemphasizes one of the two activities instead of 
pursuing both. As greater coopetition illustrates a 
smaller difference between cooperation and 
competition, we multiplied congruence scores by -1 to 
help interpretations. 
This study included five control variables: (1) 
relationship length with Amazon, (2) extent of using 
FBA, (3) percent of sales with Amazon, (4) overall 
sales, and (5) number of employees. These variables are 
chosen to control for complementors’ dependence on 
Amazon and their size. Controlling for these variables 
will better examine the impact of coopetition balance 
and coopetition capability on relationship performance. 
To decrease the common method bias, we followed 
the guideline proposed by Podsakoff et al. [25]. A 
Harman’s one-factor test was employed for common 
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method bias. Results show five factors accounting for 
80.39 percent of total variance (eigenvalue > 1) and the 
first factor accounted for 15.64 percent of the variance. 
The test suggests that common method bias is not a 
concern. 
 
7.2. Measurement properties and hypothesis 
testing 
 
This study conducted analyses in two main steps: (1) 
factor analysis through structural equation modeling and 
(2) hypothesis testing through regression analysis. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was implemented with 
Amos to assess measurement properties in our dataset. 
The measurement model using Amos showed a good fit 
(Chi-Square/d.f. = 2.737, NFI = .932, CFI = .955, IFI = 
.955, RFI = .920). The RMSEA value is .061 with 90% 
confidence level stretching from .055 to .068. All factor 
loadings were greater than .70 and were highly 
significant. Values of Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .89 
and .94, as shown in Table 2. The results showed that 
convergent validity deemed to be established. AVE in 
all constructs was greater than .500. Discriminant 
validity was examined by the square root of AVE for the 
associate construct which needs to be higher than all 
other correlations. The data used in this study had no 
concern with discriminant validity. Table 2 provides a 
correlation table with Cronbach’s alpha, AVE, and 
composite reliability for this study. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and inter-
correlations 
 
 CA a CR b AVE c 1 2 3 
1 .89 .88 .61    
2 .92 .92 .71 .24d   
3 .87 .87 .64 .26 .10  
4 .94 .94 .76 .46 .23 .14 
a Cronbach’s alpha, b Composite reliability, c Average 
variances extracted, d Squared correlation; 1:  
Cooperation, 2: Competition, 3: Coopetition capability, 4: 
Relationship performance   
 
We employed hierarchical ordinary least squares 
regression to test hypotheses postulated in this study. A 
three-step procedures were taken to investigate the 
impact of control variables at stage 1, of the main effects 
of coopetition balance and coopetition capability at 
stage 2, and of the moderating effect of coopetition 
capability between coopetition balance and relationship 
performance. Note that variables were mean-centered in 
order to reduce the potential for multicollinearity [10]. 
The regression results show that both coopetition 
balance and coopetition capability are statistically 
positive related to relationship performance, supporting 
H1(β = .17, p < .05) and H2 (β = .61, p < .01), as shown 
in Table 3. In order to assess the presence of the 
interaction term, we examined the change in R2 between 
Model 2 and Model 3 [10]. In addition, a simple slope 
analysis was conducted to inspect the form of 
interaction. This test was done by calculating simple 
sloes between plus and minus one standard deviation 
from the moderator’s mean and evaluated the 
coefficients at both levels [10]. The results in Figure 1 
are based on unstandardized results. 
The analysis uncovers two important findings. First, 
there is a significant moderating effect between 
coopetition balance and coopetition capability, 
supporting H3 (β = .38, p < 0.01), as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Summary of regression results 
 
DV: Relationship Performance 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Longevity 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Fulfilled by 
Amazon 
0.04 0.01 0.04 
% of Sales with 
Amazon 
0.11 0.03 0.01 
Sales 0.18** 0.03 0.02 
Number of 
Employees 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
Coopetition 
Balance 
 0.17** 0.15*** 
Coopetition 
Capability 
 0.61*** 0.95*** 
Coopetition 
Balance ☓ 
Coopetition 
Capability 
  0.38*** 
 
   
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.40 0.43 
ΔAdjusted R2  0.34 0.09 
ΔF 4.78*** 106.31*** 16.09*** 
*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < 001; The items reported are 
standardized regression coefficients. DV: Dependent 
variable, Variance inflation factor (VIF) were calculated 
to examine multicollinearity. VIF values are less 2.3, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
 
Results also show that it is much more effective 
when coopetition balance and coopetition capability are 
launched together. When the level of both coopetition 
balance and coopetition capability is high, relationship 
performance exhibits much stronger achievements that 
a level of both cases (i.e., 6.41 vs. 3.53), as shown in 
Figure 1. Second, the impact of coopetition balance 
ameliorates significantly in the present of coopetition 
capability, demonstrating the vital moderating role of 
coopetition capability. While complementors with a low 
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level of cooperation capability show improvements in 
relationship performance regardless of levels of 
coopetition balance, firm equipped with a high level of 
cooperation capability made a noteworthy leap from 
5.25 to 6.41 under low and high coopetition balance, 
respectively. Taken together, the simple slope analysis 
presents an evidence of moderating role of coopetition 
capability. 
 
 
Figure 1. Interaction effect between 
coopetition capability and coopetition balance 
 
8. Discussion 
 
The success of the platform ecosystem relies heavily 
on the dynamic collaboration of complementors and a 
platform owner [21, 30], but the strategic alliance can 
be polluted by direct competition due to a platform 
owner’s entry into complementors’ product space [34]. 
As a result, coopetition is established, and tensions are 
likely to be intensified under the condition of 
scarcity[22]. Unfortunately, complementors are placed 
in the position of scarcity such as a lack of customer 
access and logistical infrastructure. Coopetition can 
provide a crucial foundation for steady cooperation to 
complement each entity’s goals, while unnecessary 
stress and defense can hurt their sound relationships. 
This study helps academicians and practitioners 
understand how to increase positive responses and 
reduce negative tensions in the context of coopetition. 
 
8.1. Implications for research   
 
The first theoretical contribution of this study is to 
provide a theory-based research model that reveals how 
to enhance relationship performance through 
coopetition balance and coopetition capability. The 
literature has called for studies on bring together the 
apparent divide between cooperation and competition to 
shed light on the reality firms face in the current 
business environment [15]. As the field of coopetition 
has been drawn attention from researchers and 
practitioners, its nature and management have been 
illuminated [13, 15]. Studies, however, are generally 
theoretical or anecdotal, and empirical studies are rare. 
This study makes a contribution to literature by 
providing a theory-driven, empirically-tested model that 
nurtures a firm’s agility via coopetition and that utilizes 
resources to have an advantageous position in a 
coopetitive environment. Additionally, this study has 
employed latent congruence modeling to develop 
coopetition as the method incorporates measurement 
errors and model covariance among individual items 
under cooperation and competition. This 
methodological provision as part of finding coopetition 
balance gives robust insights into the literature. Firms 
need to harness tensions arising from cooperation and 
competition, resulting in enhancing positive responses 
and negative impacts.  
The second theoretical contribution of this study to 
elaborate on coopetition with a contextual focus on a 
platform-based market. Product/service-based 
strategies have been losing ground to platform-based 
strategies. As the network economy has been 
emphasized as part of value creation, a motto, “Forget 
Products and Forge Platform,” is prevalent in the 
business field. A platform mediates relationships 
between consumers and complementors together with 
feedback reinforcing strategies of complementary 
products and attracting more users. Studies have 
centered on platform owners as a focal point of interest: 
platform owners’ pricing decision [8, 27] and 
interactions between competing platforms [7]. 
However, studies on concentrating on complementors, 
producing significant values to a platform, are in need 
of more attention, and this perspective will give more 
holistic approaches to understanding a platform 
ecosystem. Also, research has focused on positive 
impacts of cooperation between a platform owner and 
complementors. Studies, on the other hand, emphasizes 
dark sides of collaboration, often called “swimming 
with the shark”, need receive more attention to 
investigate how small firms can produce benefits. 
Platform owners and complementors have established 
their interfirm relationships with cooperation and 
engage in competition as part of ecosystems [15]. For 
example, Intel avoids direct competition with 
competitors, but enters markets when complements’ 
products are underperforming by signaling innovations 
through competition [34]. Amazon has begun providing 
own products to customers directly, leading to 
competition with complementors. Complementors 
should be aware of their strategic position with regard 
to coopetition emphasizing value creation, cooperation, 
value appropriation or competition. This study provides 
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significant values with regard to value cocreation in the 
perspective of complementors.  
The third contribution of the study is to provide two 
coequal capacities (i.e., coopetition balance and 
coopetition capability) and their individual and 
interaction effects on relationship performance. The 
literature has acknowledged positive and negative 
effects of coopetition [2, 13], and the mixed results are 
requested to be reconciled. In other words, coopetition 
can damage value for both parties on the contrary to 
their expectations, and its negative impact should be 
much worse on complementors than on a platform 
owner due to its size and resources. As firms should go 
through three steps of accepting, accommodating, and 
differentiating/integrating [28] with regard to 
coopetitive strategies, complementors should be aware 
that coopetition is ongoing responses rather than one-
time resolution. That is, coopetition balance and 
coopetition capability are dynamic flexibility that 
complementors need to possess for their adaptive 
capacity. In the platform ecosystem, establishing 
cooperative relationships between complementors and a 
platform owner via proper communication and respect 
are crucial to creating path-breaking products [21]. 
Competition seems to be detrimental to the relationship 
in the platform ecosystem, the literature presents that it 
will reinforce their capacities over time [15]. Not only 
does coopetition balance helps sustain the stability of 
two forces but also it motivates firms to stay alert and 
continue for better performance. More critically, 
coopetition balance deters complementors to fall into 
complacency or stay the status quo. Complementors 
should manage ostensibly incompatible goals of 
cooperation and competition. While cooperating, 
complementors should strengthen their competitive 
advantage. With the complexity of the market 
landscape, taking an approach with coopetition 
capability open up more opportunities. 
 
8.2. Implications for practice   
 
This study has implications for managers who face 
competition in the platform ecosystem. Complementors 
may have engaged with a platform owner with the 
expectation of cooperation. As their products/services 
show potentials for growth, a platform owner may 
entertain a second thought and even decides to directly 
compete with complementors. This study finds a 
positive and significant impact of coopetition balance 
on relationship performance. It indicates that 
complementors should not merely focus on cooperation 
with a platform owner, but should prepare themselves 
for the competitive circumstances. As competitive 
pressures from a platform owner stream into 
relationships and gradually erode the customer base, 
complementors should also increase competitive 
approaches toward a platform owner and find a balanced 
way.   
The present study finds the presence of joint effects 
of coopetition balance and coopetition capability. The 
results of the study suggest that complementors pursue 
both coopetition balance and coopetition capability 
jointly in dealing with coopetition. Coopetition balance 
has a significant impact on relationship performance 
significantly, but there is also a moderating impact of 
coopetition capability on relationship performance. 
Regression coefficients indicate that moderating effects 
of coopetition capability between coopetition balance 
and relationship performance is higher than that of the 
individual effect of coopetition balance on relationship 
performance. Pursuing evenness of cooperation and 
competition is critical for sustaining competitive 
advantage. When the balance is combined with a firm’s 
capacity to manage paradoxical coexistence through 
coopetition capability, their adaptive capacity will be 
intensified.  
It is noteworthy to mention that coopetition 
capability is more influential than coopetition balance 
and interactions between coopetition balance and 
coopetition capability. While coopetition balance 
focuses on the evenness of cooperation and competition, 
coopetition capability is the ability to respond to the 
coopetition by seeking alternative strategies and to 
continuously adjust their relationship with the platform 
owner. It is also called evaluative capability that 
assesses situations, makes sense of realities, and 
responds to changes effectively. From the outset of the 
partnership, complementors should not only focus on 
the compliance with the platform owner but also 
develop an organizational capability to manage tensions 
and prepare themselves for changing markets. 
 
9. Conclusion  
 
This study contributes to the literature by adding 
values with conceptually theorizing and empirically 
testing coopetition capability and coopetition balance as 
important leverages that firms can cope with the 
environmental change. We extend prior research mainly 
conceptually examined. Delving into the concept of 
coopetition, more sophistically, our theory considers the 
impact of coopetition capability and balance as the 
positive consequences. In the face of such tensions from 
coopetition, balance and capability can fuel 
complementors’ adaptive capacity in the platform 
ecosystem. 
 
10. References  
      
Page 5766
[1] Bengtsson, M., T. Raza-Ullah, and V. Vanyushyn, “The 
coopetition paradox and tension: The moderating role of 
coopetition capability”, Industrial Marketing Management 
53, 2016, pp. 19–30. 
[2] Bouncken, R.B., V. Fredrich, P. Ritala, and S. Kraus, 
“Coopetition in new product development alliances: 
advantages and tensions for incremental and radical 
innovation”, British Journal of Management 29(3), 2018, pp. 
391–410. 
[3] Bouncken, R.B., J. Gast, S. Kraus, and M. Bogers, 
“Coopetition: a systematic review, synthesis, and future 
research directions”, Review of Managerial Science 9(3), 
2015, pp. 577–601. 
[4] Brandenburger, A., and B.J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition, 
Harvard Press, Boston, MA, 1996. 
[5] Cannon, J.P., and W.D. Perreault, “Buyer-seller 
relationships in business markets”, Journal of marketing 
research, 1999, pp. 439–460. 
[6] Cao, Z., and F. Lumineau, “Revisiting the interplay 
between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative 
and meta-analytic investigation”, Journal of Operations 
Management 33, 2015, pp. 15–42. 
[7] Casadesus-Masanell, R., and G. Llanes, “Mixed source”, 
Management Science 57(7), 2011, pp. 1212–1230. 
[8] Chen, J., M. Fan, and M. Li, “Advertising Versus 
Brokerage Model for Online Trading Platforms.”, MIS 
Quarterly 40(3), 2016, pp. 575–596. 
[9] Cheung, M.-S., M.B. Myers, and J.T. Mentzer, “Does 
relationship learning lead to relationship value? A cross-
national supply chain investigation”, Journal of operations 
management 28(6), 2010, pp. 472–487. 
[10] Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S.G. West, and L.S. Aiken, Applied 
multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral 
sciences, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2003. 
[11] Constantinides, P., O. Henfridsson, and G.G. Parker, 
“Introduction—Platforms and infrastructures in the digital 
age”,  29(2), 2018, pp. 381–400. 
[12] Fernhaber, S.A., and P.C. Patel, “How do young firms 
manage product portfolio complexity? The role of absorptive 
capacity and ambidexterity”, Strategic Management Journal 
33(13), 2012, pp. 1516–1539. 
[13] Gnyawali, D.R., and T.R. Charleton, “Nuances in the 
Interplay of Competition and Cooperation: Towards a Theory 
of Coopetition”, Journal of Management 44(7), 2018, pp. 
2511–2534. 
[14] Hallen, B.L., R. Katila, and J.D. Rosenberger, “How do 
social defenses work? A resource-dependence lens on 
technology ventures, venture capital investors, and corporate 
relationships”, Academy of Management Journal 57(4), 
2014, pp. 1078–1101. 
[15] Hoffmann, W., D. Lavie, J.J. Reuer, and A. Shipilov, 
“The interplay of competition and cooperation”, Strategic 
Management Journal 39(12), 2018, pp. 3033–3052. 
[16] Leslie, J., P. Li, and S. Zhao, “Managing Paradox: 
Blending East and West Philosophies to Unlock Its 
Advantages and Opportunities”, 2015. 
[17] Lewis, M.W., “Exploring paradox: Toward a more 
comprehensive guide”, Academy of Management review 
25(4), 2000, pp. 760–776. 
[18] Li, H., Y. Fang, K.H. Lim, and Y. Wang, “Platform-
Based Function Repertoire, Reputation, and Sales 
Performance of E-Marketplace Sellers”, MIS Quarterly 
43(1), 2019, pp. 207–236. 
[19] Liu, Y., Y. Luo, and T. Liu, “Governing buyer–supplier 
relationships through transactional and relational 
mechanisms: Evidence from China”, Journal of Operations 
Management 27(4), 2009, pp. 294–309. 
[20] Mathias, B.D., A. Huyghe, C.J. Frid, and T. Galloway, 
“An Identity Perspective on Coopetition in the Craft Beer 
Industry”, Strategic Management Journal 39(12), 2017, pp. 
1–30. 
[21] McIntyre, D.P., and A. Srinivasan, “Networks, 
platforms, and strategy: Emerging views and next steps”, 
Strategic Management Journal 38(1), 2017, pp. 141–160. 
[22] Miron-Spektor, E., A. Ingram, J. Keller, W.K. Smith, 
and M.W. Lewis, “Microfoundations of organizational 
paradox: The problem is how we think about the problem”, 
Academy of Management Journal 61(1), 2018, pp. 26–45. 
[23] Patel, P.C., J.G. Messersmith, and D.P. Lepak, 
“Walking the tightrope: An assessment of the relationship 
between high-performance work systems and organizational 
ambidexterity”, Academy of Management Journal 56(5), 
2013, pp. 1420–1442. 
[24] Pathak, S.D., Z. Wu, and D. Johnston, “Toward a 
structural view of co-opetition in supply networks”, Journal 
of Operations Management 32(5), 2014, pp. 254–267. 
[25] Podsakoff, P.M., S.B. MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon Lee, and 
N.P. Podsakoff, “Common Method Biases in Behavioral 
Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and 
Recommended Remedies”, Journal of Applied Psychology 
88(5), 2003, pp. 879–903. 
[26] Ritala, P., and L.-M. Sainio, “Coopetition for radical 
innovation: technology, market and business-model 
perspectives”, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 
26(2), 2014, pp. 155–169. 
[27] Seamans, R., and F. Zhu, “Responses to entry in multi-
sided markets: The impact of Craigslist on local 
newspapers”, Management Science 60(2), 2013, pp. 476–
493. 
[28] Smith, W.K., “Dynamic decision making: A model of 
senior leaders managing strategic paradoxes”, Academy of 
Management Journal 57(6), 2014, pp. 1592–1623. 
[29] Smith, W.K., and M.W. Lewis, “Toward a theory of 
paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing”, 
Academy of management Review 36(2), 2011, pp. 381–403. 
[30] Song, P., L. Xue, A. Rai, and C. Zhang, “The ecosystem 
of software platform: A study of asymmetric cross-side 
network effects and platform governance”, MIS Quarterly 
42(1), 2018, pp. 121–142. 
[31] Tiwana, A., “Evolutionary competition in platform 
ecosystems”, Information Systems Research 26(2), 2015, pp. 
266–281. 
[32] Wilhelm, M., and J. Sydow, “Managing Coopetition in 
Supplier Networks–A Paradox Perspective”, Journal of 
Supply Chain Management 54(3), 2018, pp. 22–41. 
[33] Yang, Z., C. Su, and K.-S. Fam, “Dealing with 
institutional distances in international marketing channels: 
Governance strategies that engender legitimacy and 
efficiency”, Journal of Marketing 76(3), 2012, pp. 41–55. 
[34] Zhu, F., and Q. Liu, “Competing with complementors: 
An empirical look at Amazon. com”, Strategic Management 
Journal 39(10), 2018, pp. 2618–2642. 
Page 5767
